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PAF as a COIN Air Force; How best it can earn every penny
Topic Started: Jun 24 2005, 06:07 AM (11,588 Views)
Dreamrider
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adrian, if you care to browse the other threads - you will learn that the ST specs have been posted over and over again - so many times, I get dizzy everytime I see aircraft specs. :armywink:
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saver111
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For those who haven't had the time reading previous post, you could try using the search or find box below to see related threads. It's hard switching from one thread to another comparing notes for those following topics and learning from the topics discussed only to see related, re-posted and similar discussions.

Some nice read:

Air Strike

Helos, Props or Jets?, What is the best CAS platform?

OV-10 replacement or refurbishment

NO AIR, NO FORCE: A WAKE-UP CALL

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Justice for Daniel Lorenz Jacinto

HELP END PIRACY NOW!:
http://www.itfseafarers.org/petition.cfm
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adrian_yamato
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okay, you said so.
"There's only one Government, one Armed Forces, one Contitution, & one Filipino people"

-word of then Gen. Angelo T. Reyes during the Mindanao war against the MILF & Abu Sayaff-

"The Army is like a cooked Spaggetti, You can't push it, you have to pull it after you"

-Gen George S. Patton-
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Tora^2
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:ssalute: Thank you Sir for the links!

I was able to dig up these posts from one of my older threads which I had been looking for for a long time:

Quote:
 

'The Other Side of the COIN:
Low-Technology Aircraft and Little Wars'
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchro...apj/5spr91.html

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The article, written way back in 1991, argues the case for low-end fixed-wing aircraft of the single-engine, commercially-available variety, in internal security ops. Not just in comparision to high-performance aircraft but also their equivalent low-cost helicopter equivalents.

Low-cost fixed-wing aircraft may be lowly in the fixed-wing hierarchy but compared to helicopters, their capabilities in cargo/range/endurance are close to those of even pricey high-end helicopters. They just can't take off and land vertically, that's all, but if airstrips are available (and they don’t require much), their bang-for-the-buck is great. Plus, by now we know even refurb'd Hueys are hard to come by and maintain/operate.

Something like the Cessna Caravan using crude forward airstrips could significantly relieve our Hueys of much of their logistics/troop-lift functions (Caravans can actually carry more, and farther) and allow our helicopters to focus on missions where their VTOL capability is essential.

These could have other applications like:
- recon: with under-fuselage day/night camera/FLIR, it can also be argued that a non-camo’d, discretely marked light prop would attract less attention/vigilance than readily identifiable military aircraft like the thump-thump of a Huey or the buzz of a Defender, and with the Caravan example's stated 1600km range/endurance, they could loiter in the area much longer too.
- mini-gunship: yep, they've already tried fitting a Gatling .50 to these

Those other missions would be bonuses, even just providing complementary logistics/supply and light-troop-lift could have a significant impact in support of ground operations.

The Cessna site quotes 2005 prices of new Caravans at $1.4-1.8M and I'm pretty sure good-condition used samples of these ubiquitous aircraft could also be had from private operators at a fraction of that. Looks like it’s obtainable in numbers that can make an impact.

Maintenance would also be less specialized compared to helicopters, and as such could possibly be contracted out to private firms if we don’t have enough aircraft mechanics, or want them to focus on our helos and bigger transports.



Quote:
 
Price, Prestige, and
Performance
Quote:
 

Magazines, glossy sales brochures, and international expositions such as the prestigious Farnborough (England) and Paris air shows tout aircraft as would-be "fixes" for any country facing a guerrilla threat. Although the acquisition of such aircraft may be logical and make fine military sense for some countries, it is simply counterproductive for others. A nation whose citizens have a per capita income of a thousand dollars a year and a life expectancy of 44 years is probably in no position to sink further in debt with the purchase of multiengine transports like the C-130. Even light jet "fighters"--mostly armed versions of two-seat trainers--can severely strain a poor nation's resources and logistic capabilities.

Consider, as an example of the scope of finances involved, the l8 Italian-built jet trainers recently ordered by the Royal New Zealand Air Force for no less than $120 million.5 Even jet equipment an the verge of antiquity does not come cheaply. Recently the air force of Ecuador purchased aging, refurbished T-33s outfitted for attack duties at a price of $1 million per airfrarne.6 Buying aircraft-even modest ones--is an expensive proposition and must be carefully considered by nations faced with severe financial constraints.

Advanced, expensive aircraft require complex, expensive support. Strike jets and 76,000-pound transports demand long, paved runways; engine and avionic repair shops; petroleum. oil, and lubricants facilities; and numerous other support activities. The list can run from aerospace ground equipment to nondestructive inspection labs (i.e., labs whose procedures do not harm the aircraft under inspection). This support is not only costly, but also it provides a lucrative target for guerrilla attack. That is, expensive infrastructure may well require an air force to consolidate its assets at one or two major bases that insurgents will probably recognize and exploit. Such was the case with the A-37 jets of El Salvador's air force. Comprising most of that air arm's offensive firepower and stationed at Ilopango Air Base, these aircraft became a prime objective of the Marxist Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nácional's offensive in November 1989.7 The fall of the airfield would have eliminated the government's ability to launch offensive air operations. Only bitter fighting and last-minute reinforcements prevented Ilopango from collapsing to the insurgents. The lesson is clear: unless an air force is dispersed, a concerted insurgent assault can destroy a government's air power in a single blow.

Writing these words is certainly easier than changing the attitudes of third-world military leaders in today's postcolonial era. After all, modern weapons--particularly combat aircraft--are considered symbols of nationhood in many developing states. A certain mind-set demands that jet aircraft--even a token formation--appear over the capital on independence day. Paradoxically, though, sophisticated equipment can negatively affect a nation's sovereignty. Debt and the reliance on foreign technicians, contractors, and others to help maintain advanced aircraft can easily erode the very notion of nationhood. Thus, the acquisition of such equipment can be not only economically and operationally questionable, but also politically self-defeating.

Rather than the razzle-dazzle of screaming jets or giant transports, most developing countries need an air force tailored and equipped for COIN. Its aircraft must be operationally effective and affordable. To suggest that a puddle jumper is more effective than a multimillion-dollar aircraft is regarded by some people as nothing short of heresy. Nevertheless, the United States and its allies must improve their ability to cope with insurgencies by relying primarily on brainpower and only secondarily on firepower. Hence, an appraisal of low-tech aircraft and their considerable value in COIN air operations is long overdue. 



http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchro...apj/5spr91.html



I'm not sure why the PAF never decided to to follow this idea. It will save money better spent for further capability upgrades or at the very least, to fund more troops, comm gear, night fighting systems, body armor or at the very least, larger clothing allowances to allow troops to purchase more decent boots.
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adrian_yamato
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Dreamrider
Oct 22 2007, 09:48 AM
adrian, if you care to browse the other threads - you will learn that the ST specs have been posted over and over again - so many times, I get dizzy everytime I see aircraft specs. :armywink:

dreamrider, sorry if i make you dizzy with this one, But the truth is i was fasinated by the brazilian aircraft, I never let my eyes go with this machine, our Air Force can easily aquirre this $5M aircraft,

This bird will be the thorn in the side of the insurgents in the country.

And if the PAF get 15 or 20 of this, it should be the ALX series because it's already had machineguns on both sides & if you need additional cannons, it can fitted on any of it's 5 hardpoints. :thumb:
"There's only one Government, one Armed Forces, one Contitution, & one Filipino people"

-word of then Gen. Angelo T. Reyes during the Mindanao war against the MILF & Abu Sayaff-

"The Army is like a cooked Spaggetti, You can't push it, you have to pull it after you"

-Gen George S. Patton-
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tirad
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Ya there have plenty of threads where the specs, pros/cons, etc of COIN aircraft have been posted and re-posted.

Let's also consider the required numbers. Unlike tiny El Salvador or even (South) Vietnam, we are dealing with a more expansive area and often the rebs are in the remote(st) areas.

Hoping to get an idea based on the area commands outside Manila...
Nolcom covers four regions: the Ilocos, Cordilleras, Cagayan Valley, and Central Luzon. Solcom with Calabarzon (+Mindoro?) and Bicol. Westcom with Palawan and the Spratlys. Centcom spans the Visayas islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Samar and Leyte. WestMincom is tasked with the restive areas in Sulu, Tawi-tawi, Basilan, Zambo peninsula and ARMM. EastMincom with the rest of Mindanao.

It's thus easy to see how our already meager air assets (and even ground forces) can be spread too thinly.

How many do we need of these mini-gunships or Super(-cited) Tucanos? Let's say a very modest 5 aircraft for each of Nol-, Sol-, Cent-, WestMin-, and EastMin- com would mean 25 total. Add 2 for Westcom plus a ready "surge" group of about 8 aircraft to reinforce areas with heavy fighting. Round it up with 5 for training and reserve. That's 40 at least.

Same goes for our helicopters, which is why the PAF has always said they need at least a hundred Hueys flying.
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adrian_yamato
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tirad
Oct 25 2007, 09:58 PM
Ya there have plenty of threads where the specs, pros/cons, etc of COIN aircraft have been posted and re-posted.

Let's also consider the required numbers. Unlike tiny El Salvador or even (South) Vietnam, we are dealing with a more expansive area and often the rebs are in the remote(st) areas.

Hoping to get an idea based on the area commands outside Manila...
Nolcom covers four regions: the Ilocos, Cordilleras, Cagayan Valley, and Central Luzon. Solcom with Calabarzon (+Mindoro?) and Bicol. Westcom with Palawan and the Spratlys. Centcom spans the Visayas islands of Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Samar and Leyte. WestMincom is tasked with the restive areas in Sulu, Tawi-tawi, Basilan, Zambo peninsula and ARMM. EastMincom with the rest of Mindanao.

It's thus easy to see how our already meager air assets (and even ground forces) can be spread too thinly.

How many do we need of these mini-gunships or Super(-cited) Tucanos? Let's say a very modest 5 aircraft for each of Nol-, Sol-, Cent-, WestMin-, and EastMin- com would mean 25 total. Add 2 for Westcom plus a ready "surge" group of about 8 aircraft to reinforce areas with heavy fighting. Round it up with 5 for training and reserve. That's 40 at least.

Same goes for our helicopters, which is why the PAF has always said they need at least a hundred Hueys flying.

if our Goverment able to take the tucano ALX, ilan ang kailangan? to your estimation sir tirad, :salute:
"There's only one Government, one Armed Forces, one Contitution, & one Filipino people"

-word of then Gen. Angelo T. Reyes during the Mindanao war against the MILF & Abu Sayaff-

"The Army is like a cooked Spaggetti, You can't push it, you have to pull it after you"

-Gen George S. Patton-
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adrian_yamato
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and add this to the line..............
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NH-90
"There's only one Government, one Armed Forces, one Contitution, & one Filipino people"

-word of then Gen. Angelo T. Reyes during the Mindanao war against the MILF & Abu Sayaff-

"The Army is like a cooked Spaggetti, You can't push it, you have to pull it after you"

-Gen George S. Patton-
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Tora^2
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I doubt medium-lift helicopters like the NH90 are practical in the low-intensity nature of this conflict.

In this sort of conflict, our troops fight in small formations who can be carried or whose supplies can be carried by Hueys.

One mission other air arms use med-lifts would be to haul mounted artillery pieces. However heavier types won't necessary since the PA is also equipped with 105MM OTO Melara pack howitzers which can be carried by hueys.

Furthermore, the fighting is usually in remote rural areas namely in lightly forested areas or isolated Brangay Sitios where clearings or are too tightly built to accommodate large helos.

If you ask me, we should stick to light utility helos for troop mobility and supplying outlying detachments.

The PAF would still need medium-lift helos not for COIN and not just for conventional warfare. They are better used for disaster relief operations and developmental missions.

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flipzi
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Tora^2
Oct 27 2007, 09:29 AM
I doubt medium-lift helicopters like the NH90 are practical in the low-intensity nature of this conflict.

In this sort of conflict, our troops fight in small formations who can be carried or whose supplies can be carried by Hueys.

Looking at it in a different angle, the NH-90 being capable of carrying up to 14 troopers and having used 4-bladed main rotors, which makes it quieter, may fit our SOCOM requirements.

A single chopper can deploy 14 troopers per sortie.

No problem if there's no clearing because the troops can just rapel down, like most elite units.
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