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| Bring on the sub - problems of crew training; for navies that never operated submarine | |
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| Tweet Topic Started: Jan 2 2006, 01:26 PM (555 Views) | |
| spiderweb6969 | Jan 2 2006, 01:26 PM Post #1 |
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Bring on the sub http://www.ets-news.com/third.php?id=23 David Miller looks at the problems of crew training for navies that have never previously operated submarines. There can be few more demanding naval activities than introducing submarine operations to a fleet with no previous experience. Even the simplest of modern non-nuclear patrol submarines are highly sophisticated machines, presenting those who must command and operate them with a set of unique challenges. This means that submarine crews must be trained not only in the skills required in a surface ship, such as handling, navigation and propulsion, but must also acquire new skills to cope with a totally enclosed system operating in a three-dimensional and inherently hazardous underwater environment. The captain of a surface warship is in a powerful position, but in a submarine everything depends upon the commanding officer, who is the one person with a complete knowledge of all that is happening both within and outside the boat, and whose conduct of the approach and subsequent attack require a combination of experience, technical skill and judgment of the highest order, coupled with the ability to make swift, clear and accurate decisions. The right men for such jobs must be selected carefully, taking into account their personal qualities, experience and capabilities as submariners. Further, the consequences of failure in a single crew member is far more serious than in a surface ship and can be fatal. All this requires experience only acquired over time; thus, the acquisition of a fully operational submarine capability is a lengthy and expensive process. Much training can be done ashore, for which specialised training facilities are required, including trainers for the control room team and navigators, together with equipment and trainers for engineers, maintenance men, and sensor, communications and weapons operators. Because of the dangers inherent in submarine operations, trainers are also needed for emergency ship control, damage control, firefighting and escape. Much of this can be achieved by use of computer simulation or physical representation of elements of the submarine, but one that cannot is the underwater escape trainer, a massive device which can be afforded by only a few of the major navies. For example, the British Submarine Escape Training Tower (SETT) at Gosport, is some 36m high and contains a water tank 30m deep and 5.5m in diameter, holding 864m3 of water. Acquiring a capability Currently, 40 navies operate non-nuclear patrol submarines, of which the great majority have been doing so for 30 years or more. As a result, they have developed a continuing system for selection and training, with older submariners passing on their experience, while commanding officers have worked their way up through a variety of appointments in operational submarines. The problems are, however, much more severe for a navy which is establishing a submarine fleet for the first time. There are two contemporary models for achieving this. One is to go straight for a full modern capability, which is the approach taken by the navies of the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) and Iran, both of which went straight for a fleet of modern boats. The other approach is to start with one or more elderly submarines, as has been done by the navies of Malaysia and Singapore. The South Koreans acquired nine ultra-modern German Type 209/1200s over the period 1993-2002, with the added complication that after the first boat had been built in Germany the remainder were built in Korea, initially from kits supplied from Germany, but with an ever-increasing contribution from Korean companies. The South Korean Navy had some limited experience in building and operating seven COS M.O.S. special forces minisubs (83 tons submerged displacement; six crew plus eight commandos), but these were very small and unsophisticated compared with the Type 290s. Nevertheless, the Koreans have coped remarkably well with a very ambitious programme. The Singaporeans started planning a submarine capability in the late-1980s and eventually settled on the purchase of five Swedish Sjoormen-class boats. These are relatively small (submerged displacement - 1,400 tons; crew - 18) which had entered service with the Royal Swedish Navy in 1967-69 and became surplus to their requirements in the early 1990s. Negotiations started in the early 1990s, with contracts being signed in September 1995. Four boats were refitted in Swedish yards between 1996 and 1999, with the fifth being cannibalised for spares. The Swedish Navy ran an extensive individual training programme, followed by crew training, all undertaken in Sweden. The fourth boat did not reach full operational status until 2003, meaning that the entire programme had taken some 15 years from conception to completion, while the boats were some 35 years old when the fourth arrived in Singapore. However, this was typical of Singapore’s pragmatic and careful approach to defence problems and staff planning for a successor system is now in train, which will lead to a new class entering service in the 2010-2015 timeframe. Singapore’s nearest neighbour, Malaysia, is following a slightly different path. This involves acquiring a single ex-French Agosta-class submarine on a four-year lease for training in Malaysian waters, in preparation for the arrival of two new-build Scorpene-class boats in 2007-2009. When Iran acquired a fleet of three Russian-built Kilo-class submarines between 1992 and 1997, there was, of course, a full-scale training programme in Russia. However, these large and sophisticated boats have proved difficult to keep operational, largely due to serious problems with the batteries and cooling systems which have proved inadequate for Middle Eastern conditions, but inexperience throughout the crews and shortcomings in maintenance procedures have also played a significant part. Potential submarine operators Three navies are known to be considering establishing a submarine fleet for the first time. Saudi Arabia has built up a modern and well-balanced surface navy over the past 30 years and is known to be keen to expand this to include a submarine arm comprising some six to 10 modern attack submarines. This requirement dates back to the late 1970s, with initial bids being requested from manufacturers in late 1986. At least seven designs were considered, but no order was placed. The project is currently in abeyance but could be resurrected. The Chief of the Bangladeshi Navy has stated a requirement for submarines. Whether this will prove feasible in view of the pressing need to replace some of the older elements of the surface fleet remains to be seen. Thailand has a long-standing requirement for submarines, but which has been repeatedly postponed. Recent reports suggest that the Thai Navy has expressed an interest in the three Gal-class submarines previously operated by the Israeli Navy. These were to a German design but built by Vickers in England for political reasons. The Israeli Navy would, no doubt, include a training package as part of any overall contract. |
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| Wushu | Jan 2 2006, 03:47 PM Post #2 |
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there was this story about the arab world's first sub, an iranian navy boat purchased from the soviet union..... during its launch, after much rejoicing, it disappeared without a trace..... they said it met an accident.... or maybe sunk by an israeli sub..... |
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| spiderweb6969 | Jan 2 2006, 07:48 PM Post #3 |
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really? i didn't know that.....can i have the link to that storey.... |
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| saver111 | Jan 2 2006, 08:23 PM Post #4 |
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PDFF Moderator
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I think there was sub of the Israeli's that was gone missing in 1968 and was located sometime 1999, INS Dakar (Z-77) Date of Loss: 25 January, 1968
http://www.lostsubs.com/Dakar.htm |
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Justice for Daniel Lorenz Jacinto HELP END PIRACY NOW!: http://www.itfseafarers.org/petition.cfm | |
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| Wushu | Jan 3 2006, 02:05 PM Post #5 |
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im confused..... i read it as a sidebar in a janes naval mag issue way way back.... was it the first israeli sub sunk by the soviets or the first arab sub sunk by the israelis? reading saver's link, i think i may have interchanged the israelis with the arabs.... which side first had a sub anyway? |
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| saver111 | Jan 3 2006, 08:38 PM Post #6 |
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PDFF Moderator
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Some more stories and pics of the INS Dakar: http://www.memagazine.org/backissues/augus...es/sub/sub.html http://www.dolphin.org.il/dakar/ By the way before that they also lost the Leviathan in 27 May 1967 , Drowning? http://www.lostsubs.com/E_Cold.htm |
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Justice for Daniel Lorenz Jacinto HELP END PIRACY NOW!: http://www.itfseafarers.org/petition.cfm | |
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