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| The Kalayaan, Panatag & other disputed islands; Future conflict zones? | |
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| Tweet Topic Started: Feb 2 2005, 08:00 PM (156,011 Views) | |
| Xwolf | Oct 1 2011, 01:35 PM Post #1131 |
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Bring it on! Give me the Excuse to blow those (Mother F^%$#) sky high!
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-I love the smell of Napalm in the morning.- | |
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| Xwolf | Oct 2 2011, 10:22 PM Post #1132 |
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As for the former President FVR, he's such a pussy! practically no balls! |
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-I love the smell of Napalm in the morning.- | |
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| Hitman | Oct 2 2011, 11:06 PM Post #1133 |
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the government should at least confiscate some of his illegal wealth, businesses or property. Maybe not all but at least get something. The government should start employing dirty tricks to these high past profile crooks in some way to get something back if they do not want to prosecute them. Dirty tricks may work for now. Because we all know the government is a pussy when it comes to prosecuting past crooks like Garcia, Ligot, FVR, GMA, etc. I can understand the concern due to these past crooks still have connections in the military and can start a drity tricks themselves. However, the government is the authority and have more power of course. If the Justice Dept and PNP play dirty tricks on these and not prosecute them then no one will listen to them crooks for help. Some of the tricks is like BIR audit of their businesses, checking business licenses if current, and if not make them pay hefty fines, failure or delay in paying taxes should be punishable by confiscating properties and assets, expose their illegal activities to the media, etc. |
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| spearhead | Oct 3 2011, 05:50 AM Post #1134 |
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DoctorNO, Your Neutral Observer.
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^^If only Noynoy Aquino got the balls to bring back the Death Penalty. |
"Men of War must learn the art of numbers or he will not know how to array his troops." - Plato![]() ![]() | |
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| migzky19 | Oct 3 2011, 12:49 PM Post #1135 |
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Analysis Aquino’s balance of power diplomacy over Spratlys By: Amando Doronila Philippine Daily Inquirer 2:54 am | Monday, October 3rd, 2011 Last month laid the foundation of an Asian alliance aimed at checking aggressive Chinese naval incursions into disputed territories in the West Philippine Sea, referred to by Beijing as the South China Sea, in a David-and-Goliath message of defiance to Beijing’s hegemonic intentions over the maritime region. On his return on September 28 from a four-day Tokyo visit, President Aquino claimed he brought home $1.4 billion in fresh investment and Japanese support for a multilateral solution to the disputed Spratly Islands. The alignment of Japan with four of Asean’s (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 10 members—the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei—in a concerted action to channel the dispute into a diplomatic framework of negotiations is clearly more important than the economic assistance package. The results from the Tokyo trip followed those from the United States the week before—a visit that ended with the President coming home empty-handed in economic benefits. At the end of the Tokyo visit, the Philippine leader and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda issued a statement contradicting China’s position that wants a bilateral solution to conflicting claims to the Spratly Islands. The joint communiqué said, “The two leaders confirmed that the South China Sea is vital, as it connects the world and the Asia Pacific region, and that peace and stability therein is of common interest to the international community.” It emphasized “the need for a rules-based (approach) for addressing and resolving disputes and promoting cooperation” in the region. The leaders also “expressed their hope of the early formulation of a legally binding code of conduct that is consistent with established international law.” The two leaders said, “As leaders of countries sharing lines of communication, they also confirmed that freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce, and compliance with established international law, including the Unclos (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), and the peaceful settlement of disputes serve the interests of the two and the whole region.” Freedom of navigation Though not a claimant to the Spratly Islands, Japan came on board to join the Asean claimants, saying vessels that deliver oil it imports from the Middle East pass through vital sea lanes in the West Philippine Sea. The sea is the main corridor for the shipment of 88 percent of oil imported by Japan from the Middle East, according to the Japanese Embassy in Manila. “Japan is also very concerned about it as the freedom of navigation of Japanese vessels plying (the area),” said Philippine Ambassador to Tokyo Manuel Lopez. Japan’s weight in pushing for multilateral solutions is significant in that it is the second regional naval power next to China in the West Philippine Sea. Tensions between China and the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan over conflicting claims in the region have escalated over the past few months following increased naval activities in the area. The Philippines repeatedly complained this year of aggressive acts of the Chinese military in the West Philippine Sea, which is believed to hold vast oil and gas deposits. Manila has accused Beijing of firing on Filipino fishermen, laying buoys on Philippine islets, and intimidating oil exploration vessels. Nucleus of an entente China claims all of the West Philippine Sea and insists it has sole rights to all of the area, including islands claimed by the Philippines. Japan’s intervention is likely to anger China. China has called for bilateral negotiations on the disputes, a strategy that would effectively shut out other countries like the United States and Asean members. The Philippines has proposed that Manila and Tokyo set up a “permanent working group” that would regularly tackle other Asian maritime concerns—a proposal that has the potential of becoming the working mechanism of a Japan, Philippines and Vietnam axis—with the two Asean members acting as the nucleus of an entente, given that Vietnam and the Philippines have had encounters with Chinese naval intrusions in the West Philippine Sea and have been building their own naval capability to stand up to the Chinese Navy that is now projecting its growing might in a display of gunboat diplomacy. In August, China launched its first aircraft carrier which embarked on sea trials “in a potent demonstration of the growing naval power that is creating pride at home—and concern in the region.” According to the Guardian newspaper in the United Kingdom, while China says it will only ever use naval power for defensive purposes, others say it is increasingly aggressive in pursuing its claims. The refitting of the former Soviet aircraft carrier, Varyag, which China bought from Ukraine in 1998, according to the Guardian report, “is part of China’s broader naval modernization program—which includes heavy spending on submarines and the development an antimissile system—and comes amid growing competition with the US and India, and a string of maritime disputes with closer neighbors.” Shifting balance of power The Guardian quotes Hoshihiko Yamada, a professor at Japan’s Tokai University: “This is showing the whole world that China’s maritime mobility is expanding drastically. This is showing that China is in the process of acquiring capability to control the South China Sea, as well as the East China Sea.” In the past year, “China has seen a series of territorial spats with Japan over islets in the East China Sea; and with the Philippines, Vietnam and others over the South China Sea, the location of essential shipping lanes and important resources. These disputes are complicated by underlying competition with the US and India.” According to Dr. Ian Storey of the Institution of Asian Studies Singapore, as reported by the Guardian, “by itself, the ship (the aircraft carrier) does not erode the credibility of America’s military presence in the region nor greatly increase China’s power projection capabilities. Nevertheless, the vessel is a potent symbol of China’s aspirations to become a global maritime power and is yet another indication that military balance of power is gradually shifting in China’s favor.” President Aquino is trying his hands in balance of power diplomacy over the Spratlys. Does he have the mind and the world view to handle the challenge? http://opinion.inquirer.net/13297/aquino%E...y-over-spratlys |
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| Xwolf | Oct 3 2011, 01:02 PM Post #1136 |
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In other words since they claim the whole West Philippine sea(South China Sea) they will use their Luxury Aircraft Carrier in Defense of their Property. Its War Gentlemen, all we need is just somebody to fire the first shot!
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-I love the smell of Napalm in the morning.- | |
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| Hitman | Oct 4 2011, 08:09 AM Post #1137 |
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here is the latest news in WPS Eurasia Review Newsletter Eurasia Review Great Mercedes-Benz deals. Call now and mention Eurasia Review for discount. Browse: Home / Analysis / The South China Sea Dilemma: Options For The Main Actors – Analysis The South China Sea Dilemma: Options For The Main Actors – Analysis Written by: RSIS October 3, 2011 Beijing’s attempt to halt Delhi’s oil and gas exploration off the Vietnamese coast is reviving tensions in the South China Sea. What are the challenges and implications for the key actors in the region? By Subathra R. Periyaswamy CHINA RECENTLY objected to an Indian-Vietnamese joint venture to explore for oil and gas off the coast of Vietnam, on the ground that it infringed China’s sovereignty over the whole South China Sea. As China’s definition of its core interests expands into areas beyond territorial limits, Chinese assertion of de jure sovereignty over the sea is renewing tensions and exacerbating anxiety among its neighbours in East Asia. South China Sea South China Sea Geostrategic ambitions, historical claims and legal interpretations have led to overlapping claims by other key actors Philippines and Vietnam, as well as disputes with the United States and ASEAN over navigation rights. Emerging Regional Challenges The fundamental challenge for the actors is striking a balance between growing Chinese assertiveness and greater regional cooperation, and most importantly avoiding a miscalculation in the process. While economic considerations take precedence, nevertheless the Chinese strategic perspective is crucial to prospects of regional stability. It is imperative that Washington exercise patience and caution to avoid any great-power confrontation and for regional institutions to bolster a unified response to China’s contentious claims. Beyond historical rights to adjacent seas, Beijing has a keen interest in securing South China Sea waters as a strategic frontier vis-à-vis the US bases in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing’s challenge hardens claimants’ refusal to relinquish their competing rights, while a disconnect between Chinese ambitions and regional needs has its limitations. Hence, it engages in a unique bilateral-multilateral foreign policy with regard to the South China Sea. Multilateralism is invoked as part of its charm offensive to engage with non-East Asian countries such as the US and India, while bilateral ties are employed to pursue interests with individual East Asian countries. The primacy of economic considerations has underpinned China’s success in pushing its political agenda and expanding its influence, thus placing regional stakeholders in an unfavourable bargaining position. Smaller stakeholders in the Philippines and Vietnam do not want to “lose face” by consenting to China’s every geostrategic move. Moreover, the Philippines and Vietnam have sought to cooperate in maritime and ocean ventures and are keen on having joint ventures in oil and gas exploration with other countries. Hence, they would like to work with China on the South China Sea given a cooperative platform. But, Beijing’s uncooperativeness and assertiveness have left these countries with no choice but to balance diplomatic engagements with China with economic cooperation with the US or India and joining the US and ASEAN in calling for multilateral resolution of disputed claims. Bridging the Gap The US and ASEAN are now faced with the task of bridging the gap between a geopolitically assertive China and a region which sees the need for a multilaterally engaged China focused on a regional agenda rather than just its national interests. The US is increasingly finding itself treading the dangerous line between saying too much and doing too little. If Washington says too much at the behest of regional stakeholders, it will risk a power confrontation with Beijing which sees external interference as an infringement on its sovereignty. If the US does too little it runs the risk of China entrenching itself as the central power in the region. While the former scenario has the potential to escalate to a military stand-off, the latter will establish new power dynamics ensuring the loss of Washington’s strategic front in Southeast Asia and the erosion of US security and strategic agenda in the Asia-Pacific region. Both these trajectories are unacceptable to the US and creates situations which it wants to eschew. However, ASEAN’s strategic position, political leverage and architecture have the potential to be a catalyst in resolving the South China Sea dilemma, but a lack of consensus among members stalls action. The US-China relationship will shape global governance as seen in the US debt crisis, with China being the largest foreign holder of US treasuries. It will be unwise for the US to be aggressive in China-Taiwan relations and over the South China Sea. The US must understand China’s needs and challenges and adopt a nuanced policy position. The US should understand the predicament of a new rising power as it was in the same position as China is now, before World War 2. It is time for the US to be gracious in viewing the new rising power as a partner rather than a competitor. If managed carefully, the US can assist China to integrate fully into the evolving and stable international system. Measured Steps On the other hand, the role of ASEAN in the South China Sea is crucial in strengthening its multilateral institutional mechanisms and ensuring Washington undertakes measured steps to prevent any miscalculation. Members of ASEAN have taken varying positions in the South China Sea dispute: Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar are sympathetic to China; Malaysia and Indonesia have been cautious towards US interference; Thailand and Singapore are neutral while Vietnam and the Philippines are wary of balance-of-power considerations. China is approaching a stage of “economic maturity” with the characteristics of a normal rising economic giant whose goal is stability and growth, and will possibly evolve to be a more mature and responsible international actor. Nevertheless, it is natural to expect greater assertiveness and tensions to continue to afflict the South China Sea. But these changes could be more a blessing than a bane; they can help to strengthen the fundamentals of ASEAN and encourage a more proactive and responsible relationship between the traditional superpower and the rising power — the US and China. Given the dynamics in the South China Sea disputes, Churchill’s dictum “to jaw-jaw is better than to war-war” has a timeless relevance in the changing geopolitical situation in East Asia. Subathra R. Periyaswamy is a Research Analyst with the United States Programme in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU). |
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| migzky19 | Oct 4 2011, 03:35 PM Post #1138 |
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South China Sea: The New Battleground By Shar Adams Epoch Times StaffCreated: Oct 3, 2011Last Updated: Oct3,2011 A Vietnamese fishing boat sails near an American warship in Da Nang earlier this year. Planned naval exchange activities between US and Vietnamese navies were taking place amid high tensions over conflicting claims in the South China Sea. (Hoang Dinh Nam/AFP/Getty Images Earlier this year, unprecedented protests were held in Vietnam, a Communist regime that notoriously stamps out any form of dissent. The demonstrations were about China’s aggressive antics in the South China Sea. China is claiming an exclusive economic zone covering more than half the area and has recently come into conflict with Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam. Dr Cuong Trong Bui, president of the Queensland chapter of the Vietnamese Community in Australia, is concerned that China is “bullying” countries over the South China Sea. “Vietnam lodged a protest when Chinese vessels on 26th of May damaged cables and equipment within Vietnam’s 370km exclusive maritime zone,” he told The Epoch Times. “The Vietnamese Government said a similar incident again took place on 9th of June, blaming China for violating its sovereignty,” he said. Dr Bui, a former Vietnamese refugee and now an advisor to the Queensland Government on multicultural affairs, says he is suspicious of the Vietnamese regime for allowing the recent protests. Public protests are rare in Vietnam today, particularly against China, a communist ally. The demonstrations have the appearance of sovereignty concerns in order to appease Vietnamese people, he “They [Vietnam and China] are playing games,” he said. “One day, they pretend they are fighting and another day, it is ok.” “We have to warn people about China [and] speak up for the people living in Vietnam. They don’t have the opportunity to say as much as we can here and that is the problem,” Dr Bui said. South China Sea Vietnamese people are not the only ones with concerns about the South China Sea. The area is fraught with old territorial disputes and with developing economic strength in the region, the stakes are becoming higher. Robert Kaplan, author, journalist and a member of the US Defence Department’s Defence Policy Board, believes the South China Sea is shaping up to be the forum for a new era of conflict for the 21st century. “Europe is a landscape, East Asia a seascape. Therein lies a crucial difference between the 20th and 21st centuries,” he wrote in the online forum Foreign Policy. The South China Sea stretches thousands of kilometres from the Straits of Malacca in the south-west to the Straits of Taiwan in the north-east. Territorial claimants include Taiwan, Malaysia, Japan, the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore Vietnam, Indonesia and China, who all vie for different sectors of the straits. Disputed areas include the Macclesfield Bank claimed by China, Taiwan and the Philippines; the Paracel Islands, with claims from China, Vietnam and Taiwan; and the most southerly group of larger islands, the Spratly Islands, claimed in full by China, Taiwan and Vietnam, and in part by the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. In 1988, more than 70 Vietnamese sailors were killed by Chinese military in territorial disputes off the Spratly Islands. Although variously named according to which country is claiming it, the waterway is more broadly known as the South China Sea as a result of 16h century European interest in it as a trade route to the riches of China. Strategic Significance Today, the South China Sea’s strategic and economic significance is staggering. Accounting for 2-way trade, it is presently the busiest seaway in the world, linking north-east Asia to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf through the Straits of Malacca. A third of all maritime traffic and “more than half the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through South China Sea,” writes Mr Kaplan. The amount of oil transported through the South China Sea, fuelling the big economies of Taiwan, Japan, China and South Korea, is more than six times the amount that passes through the Suez Canal, he writes. “This comprises nearly two-thirds of South Korea’s energy supplies, nearly 60 per cent of Japan’s and Taiwan’s energy supplies, and about 80 per cent of China’s crude-oil imports,” Mr Kaplan writes. According to Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd, 60 per cent of Australia’s trade must also traverse the South China Sea. With the rise in demand for energy resources, historical maritime disputes have been further exacerbated by the discovery of oil and gas in the region. According to Mr Kaplan, proven oil reserves stand at around 7 billion barrels and natural gas at 900 trillion cubic feet, but estimations of potential reserves stand at much more. Potential for Conflict While it is understandable for countries to defend the security of their energy supplies, the Chinese regime has taken aggressive action in the area. Chinese forces have openly provoked the Philippines, putting up structures and patrolling in areas claimed by the Philippines, and allegedly opening fire on Filipino fishermen, AFP reported earlier this year. China has caused similar incidents with Japan and Indonesia. China has also driven the regional agenda, insisting on a “divide and rule” approach of bilateral negotiations rather than multilateral. The weakness of regional architecture to deal with disputes is a major defence concern. “Security in the Asia-Pacific region is not underwritten by the strong institutional mechanisms that we take for granted in the West,” noted Mr Rudd in a speech to university students in Tasmania earlier this year. As China increasingly flexes its muscle in the region, South-East Asian nations have increasingly sought US engagement. The United States has, accordingly, responded by holding joint naval exercises with a number of nations in the region, including Vietnam. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in Hanoi earlier this year that the US had “a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea”. She called for a “collaborative diplomatic process.” Code of Conduct However, solutions must ultimately come from within the region and to that effect, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the region’s largest multilateral forum, has been working to address tensions between China and ASEAN. But it has taken 20 years. “Things do not necessarily have to be this slow,” said Indonesian President Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at a keynote speech to ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Bali in July. “We need to send a strong signal to the world that the future of the South China Sea is a predictable, manageable and optimistic one.” Indeed, the 10 member states of ASEAN did agree to guidelines on a 2002 Declaration of Conduct at the Bali meetings, but analysts and some member states have expressed dissatisfaction. “It sounds impressive, but it will have almost no impact on the risks of incidents at sea,” says Rory Medcalf, a former Australian diplomat and intelligence analyst with the Lowy Institute. “We are hearing fuzzy, high-sounding diplomatic talk—but this is not a proper code of conduct.” Speaking on ABC radio, Mr Rudd said a third stage of negotiations will develop a more detailed code of conduct for the region.“That’s the next piece of work and I think, having spoken to many of my ASEAN colleagues, they’ve got their sleeves rolled up ready to this next important task in order to preserve the peace and security of our wider region,” he said. http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/vi...1/99999999/1/1/ |
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| Hitman | Oct 5 2011, 08:52 PM Post #1139 |
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SPEAKING FREELY The South China Sea is not China's Sea By Huy Duong It would be rather absurd if England were to try to claim sovereignty over most of the English Channel, Iran the Persian Gulf, Thailand the Gulf of Thailand, Vietnam the Gulf of Tonkin, Japan the Sea of Japan, or Mexico the Gulf of Mexico. But that is exactly what China is trying to do by claiming most of the South China Sea, a body of water about the size of the Mediterranean Sea bordered by nine nations plus Taiwan, and the main gateway between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Although there are long-standing territorial disputes over the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands, the biggest security risk for the South China Sea is not the conflicting claims over these tiny islands and rocks but China's outright claim to this strategically important body of water. Most international experts on maritime disputes, including even some Chinese ones, regard China's claim to be inconsistent with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China's claim is represented by the so-called "U-shaped line" or "nine-dashed line" map that depicts a line encircling most of the South China Sea. This map was first published by the Republic of China in 1948 under the heading "Map of the locations of the South China Sea Islands". The name indicates that it was a map of the islands within the U-shaped line, not a claim to the entire maritime space. At that time international law only allowed a claim of territorial sea up to three nautical miles, beyond which was considered international waters. For decades, this map has remained obscure. Until now Chinese scholars have disagreed on what the map means and its legal basis. China's own territorial sea declaration in 1958 only claimed 12 nautical miles and declared that international waters separated its mainland and the islands which it claimed. In other words, China's own declaration then affirmed that most of the maritime space within the U-shaped line map was international waters. With newfound wealth after successful economic reforms launched in the 1980s and more recent rising naval strength, China's territorial ambitions have grown to encompass not just the disputed Paracels and Spratlys but also most of the South China Sea. Consequently, China resurrected the U-shaped line map as if it were a claim to maritime space dating back to 1948, whereas in fact it was a map about the position of islands and by law it could never have been a legitimate claim to maritime space. In the 1990s, China started to make claims to some oil blocks within the U-shaped line in and near the Nam Con Son Basin between Vietnam and Indonesia. In 2009, China included the U-shaped line map in notes verbales to the United Nations' Commission on the Limit of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to assert its maritime claim. This was the first time China sent the U-shaped line map to an intergovernmental body. Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines responded with their own notes verbales to the CLCS to reject China's claim and the U-shaped line map. Vietnam's notes maintained that China's claim as represented by the U-shaped line "has no legal, historical or factual basis, therefore is null and void." Indonesia's note said that the U-shaped line map "clearly lacks international legal basis and is tantamount to upset the UNCLOS 1982." The Philippines' note said that China's claim to most of the South China Sea "would have no basis under international law, specifically UNCLOS". Instead of being deterred, China is becoming more assertive. In March 2011, two Chinese patrol ships threatened to ram a vessel that was carrying out seismic survey at the Reed Bank on behalf of the Philippines. According to the Philippines, the Reed Bank is not part of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) belonging to the Spratlys. In May 2011, a Chinese maritime survey ship cut the seismic sensor cable of a Vietnamese survey ship operating in an area closer to Vietnam's continental coast than to the disputed Paracels and Spratlys. In June 2011, Chinese fishing boats deliberately ran across the seismic sensor cable of another Vietnamese survey ship which was also operating in an area closer to Vietnam's continental coast than to the disputed Paracels and Spratlys. Regarding these incidents, on June 27, the US Senate unanimously passed a resolution in which it "deplores the use of force by naval and maritime security vessels from China in the South China Sea." The resolution also noted that one of the incidents "occurred within 200 nautical miles of Vietnam, an area recognized as its Exclusive Economic Zone". In August 2011, the Philippines challenged China to take the dispute to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. China did not accept the challenge, which the Philippines took to underline the fact that China's claim is weak in law. In the latest episode in September, China warned India that joint exploration with Vietnam in the latter's Blocks 127 and 128 amounted to a violation of China's sovereignty - despite the fact that these blocks were much closer to Vietnam's continental coasts than to the disputed Paracels and Spratlys. China justified its position by saying that, "The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea does not entitle any country to extend its exclusive economic zone or continental shelf to the territory of another country." In effect, China is trying to use the "historical claims and rights" argument to negate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. According to international law, no nation can claim Blocks 127 and 128 as its sovereign territory. Legally speaking, as an area submerged under the sea, these blocks are not "susceptible to sovereignty", i.e., they cannot be claimed as the territory of any country. Therefore, Blocks 127 and 128 can only be maritime space governed by international law. According to international law, in 1947 that area was international waters, and today it is part of Vietnam's EEZ. Regarding the "historical claims and rights" argument, at the Third Biennial Conference of the Asian Society of International Law in August 2011, the Indonesian Ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Union obliquely dismissed it as being "at best ridiculous" as follows, ... the "historic claims of historic waters" is problematic for Asia because Asia is a region rich with ancient kingdoms which were both land and maritime powers. Srivijaya Kingdom which has its capital in Sumatra island in seventh century ruled many parts of Southeast Asia and spanned its control all the way to Madagascar. For Indonesia to claim waters corresponding to its history would be at best ridiculous. Clearly, if nations were allowed to use the "historical claims and rights" argument to claim vast swathes of the world's oceans and seas at the expense of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - which stipulates that coastal nations have an EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles - it would make a mockery of the Convention. For example, the "historical claims and rights" argument would allow Britain, which "waved the rules and ruled the waves" far more than China ever did, to claim rights over most of the world's oceans and seas. Without having the courage of conviction to go to an international court, China relies on using its superior hard and soft powers to press its claim against smaller Southeast Asian countries in the area. Against this pressure, Southeast Asian parties to the dispute need to improve their individual and collective strength but they also need support from major powers, such as the US, India, Japan, Russia and European Union. For their own sake, the major powers must not abandon the South China Sea to be turned into a Chinese lake and Southeast Asian nations to fall into China's orbit. That would be disastrous not only to the Southeast Asian countries but ultimately also to the major powers themselves and for the legal order over the ocean that the international community has tried so hard to establish since the 1980s. Huy Duong is a freelance writer. His articles on the South China Sea disputes have appeared on Asia Sentinel, the BBC's website, The Diplomat, Manila Times and VietNam Net. He would like to thank Duat Le, Truong Tran, Dang Vu, Nghia Tran and other friends for valuable comments on this article. (Copyright 2011 Huy Duong.) |
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| spearhead | Oct 5 2011, 09:53 PM Post #1140 |
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DoctorNO, Your Neutral Observer.
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Chinese policy in WPS is absurd. |
"Men of War must learn the art of numbers or he will not know how to array his troops." - Plato![]() ![]() | |
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8:31 AM Jul 11