| Welcome to Philippines Defense Forces Forum. We hope you enjoy your visit. You're currently viewing our forum as a guest. This means you are limited to certain areas of the board and there are some features you can't use. If you join our community, you'll be able to access member-only sections, and use many member-only features such as customizing your profile, sending personal messages, and voting in polls. Registration is simple, fast, and completely free. Join our community! If you're already a member please log in to your account to access all of our features: |
| Why We Must Defend UNCLOS; Only by defending constitutions, laws and treaties are the only way for them to have meaning. | |
|---|---|
| Tweet Topic Started: Sep 9 2014, 06:03 PM (1,344 Views) | |
| Hong Nam | Sep 9 2014, 06:03 PM Post #1 |
|
Bought by China
![]()
|
Why We Must Defend UNCLOS Only by defending constitutions, laws and treaties are the only way for them to have meaning. By James R. Holmes September 06, 2014 If we place too much faith in the power of written documents such as constitutions, laws, and international covenants of various types. Putting the right words on the page constitutes part of the challenge. That's what lawmakers and diplomats do. But succeeding generations of human beings are what puts meaning into - or allows it to be drained from - those words. A written compact can lose force if posterity comes to doubt its legitimacy, if it falls out of step with the times, or if its opponents deliberately undermine it. Those hostile to a pact, in part or in whole, can reinterpret its plain meaning - reshaping or subverting it altogether over time. Which is why even a clearly worded pact like the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea - a covenant that can seemingly stand on its own - needs defenders. There is a warning against trusting to "parchment barriers" to stave off bad things. At the end of the day, then, it's up to those who live under a constitution, law, or treaty to uphold its meaning. Seafaring states represent the arbiters of whether the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea continues to mean what it says. That's why rebuking China's efforts to redefine the plain meaning of UNCLOS is so crucial. Friends of freedom of the sea should do it early and often. Don't let Beijing - or anyone else - shred the parchment barrier against nautical tyranny. The Diplomat Edited by Hong Nam, Sep 9 2014, 06:08 PM.
|
![]() Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie - C Sword 90 | |
![]() |
|
| Hong Nam | Sep 9 2014, 06:04 PM Post #2 |
|
Bought by China
![]()
|
China's War on Maritime Law China is using language to quietly redefine international maritime law. By James R. Holmes September 04, 2014 Never surrender to China in the battle of language, Washington. Ceding control of the words we use can be fatal to diplomacy. If you let someone define the words used in an argument how he pleases, or if you let him use terms so imprecisely that they lose all meaning, you let him establish the assumptions from which the argument proceeds. And once he sets the assumptions, he can prove whatever he wants. You will lose every time. Language, then, is a battleground. Exhibit A: Beijing's effort to coopt the language of maritime law in the recent controversy over aerial intercepts. Ace Defense News reporter Wendell Minnick recounts an exchange with Wang Dong, director of the School of International Studies, Center for Northeast Asian Strategic Studies, Peking University. The topic: PLA Air Force interception and harassment of a U.S. Navy P-8 anti-submarine-warfare jet east of Hainan Island. Wang Dong: There is a strong sense in China that the U.S. has abused the definition of 'innocent passage' under UNCLOS. Stop right there. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, innocent passage refers to the right of ships to pass through a coastal state's territorial sea (12 nautical miles) provided it refrains from doing things that could infringe on the coastal state's security. The treaty text lists such activities as military surveillance. Innocent passage is a meaningless term beyond the territorial sea. It has no bearing on the coastal state's exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, which extends from 200 to 350 nautical miles offshore depending on the underwater geography. Freedom of the sea prevails there. Freedom means freedom. The P-8 was some 135 nautical miles east of Hainan and at liberty to execute its mission. U.S. and allied spokesmen must debunk the use of the term innocent passage every time Beijing applies it to the EEZ. Wang Dong: U.S. spy planes are not doing sightseeing or picnicking; rather, they're engaged in intensive, intrusive military intelligence gathering on a massive scale and sustained manner, which not only severely threatens China's national security, but also violates China's law. Tough luck. Like all coastal states, China is sovereign only over its territorial seas and airspace. Chinese law does not govern what shipping or aircraft do within its exclusive economic zone, let alone within Beijing's absurd nine (or ten) - dashed line enclosing most of the South China Sea. If U.S. Navy air pirates are poaching fish or drilling for oil, then China has a case. That its leadership wants to control sea and sky so very, very much doesn't make its policy law. Wang Dong: The U.S. would not allow these types of operations along its mainland coastline. This is another standard Chinese talking point, but repeating it incessantly doesn't make it true. Wang needs to review his Cold War history. Soviet ships and aircraft operated along European and North American shores as a matter of routine. Western ships and aircraft did the same off Warsaw Pact shores. Americans and Soviets came to accept such endeavors as legitimate moves in that strategic contest. Let's remind our Chinese friends about Cold War history rather than let such claims go unanswered. Welcome to the big leagues, China. Wang Dong: UNCLOS does not give a country the right to engage in 'hostile' actions in others' EEZs. The U.S. position that what they're doing is perfectly legitimate is viewed as highly hypocritical, since the U.S. military perhaps remains the only military superpower that has the capability to conduct such intrusive intelligence-gathering operations in a sustained manner. The Pentagon defines... - "Hostile intent" as the "threat of imminent use of force" against one's homeland, forces, nationals, or property. - "Imminent threat" is an international standard justifying the anticipatory use of force. Justifying PLA pilots' conduct may be Wang's point. Let's challenge attempts to redefine routine military operations as virtual acts of war. As far as U.S. operations being viewed as hypocritical... the fact that some nations choose not to exercise certain prerogatives in the global commons doesn't nullify those prerogatives for nations that do. If China wants to use the commons the same way America does, let it build the capacity to do so, and then go for it. The U.S. has run a Freedom of Navigation Program for some thirty years now. U.S. vessels deliberately flout an unlawful maritime claim. Washington thus establishes a record for opposing such claims. That keeps them from congealing into international custom and, eventually, law. The coastal state seldom says much about it. In effect the parties agree to disagree, and move on. But when a major power pushes extralegal claims and puts steel behind them, it's time for fellow seafaring states to mount a more vocal, more forceful defense of freedom of the seas. Otherwise the principle could decay over time. The Diplomat |
![]() Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie - C Sword 90 | |
![]() |
|
| Hong Nam | Sep 24 2014, 03:43 PM Post #3 |
|
Bought by China
![]()
|
Artificial Islands in the South China Sea With this latest twist, Beijing now appears to feel the time is right to change the facts on the ground. By P K Ghosh September 23, 2014 The turbulent South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as a regional flashpoint, with sovereignty disputes over rocks and islands driving increasing tensions. Recently, a new twist to the saga has emerged, in the form of new artificial islands being created by China in an effort to bolster its sovereign claims. While the other claimants in the region - Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan and Malaysia - are all in control of natural islands, China is the first to control the artificial variety. These news islands and enlargements are essentially new, and have the potential to intensify the disputes and the associated level of acrimony. One of the most noticeable changes that have occurred has been in the Spratly Islands. Until the beginning of 2014, the Chinese presence in these islands consisted of a handful of outposts that comprised a collection of concrete block-type houses perched atop coral atolls. Now, China is expanding most of these islands, rocks, and submerged reefs through landfill with sand dug from nearby reefs, which is being dumped to create new structures. After the landfill is completed, the existing minimal infrastructure is considerably upgraded. In some cases, the newer islands are being created from submerged reefs and shoals. Presently, activity is underway on five different reefs. The current attempt to build artificial islands has caused considerable anxiety amongst other claimants. The primary concern stems from the fact that China is preparing to build an entire air base along with a concrete runway meant for fighter jets on the Johnson South Reef, mainly to assert its claim over the Spratly Islands. Civilian ships are planned to be modified to become large, low-cost floating production platforms in the South China Sea. Other vessels will be used to deliver water, as there are no sources of groundwater in the area. It is apparent that Beijing now feels the time is right to assert its sovereign claims, with aggressive posturing if necessary and by creating new facts on the ground, including a string of island bases and an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the form of an air base right in the middle of the South China Sea. What is not apparent is whether such moves will reinforce its claims in the eyes of international law. The Diplomat Edited by Hong Nam, Sep 24 2014, 03:58 PM.
|
![]() Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie - C Sword 90 | |
![]() |
|
| Hong Nam | Sep 26 2014, 03:25 AM Post #4 |
|
Bought by China
![]()
|
Blocking China's salami-slicing tactics on the South China Sea require region-wide cooperation David Brown - YaleGlobal 25 September 2014 The US cannot ignore China's drive to establish hegemony over the seas that touch its shores. China has mounted a determined challenge to the international order expressed in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, and the notion that territorial disputes should be settled, not by force, but by negotiation or arbitration. Six years ago China presented a crude map to illustrate its claim to "indisputable sovereignty" over the area bounded by a nine-dash line enclosing 3.5 million square kilometers. With each year that's passed since then, China's upped the ante. Deploying hundreds of deep-sea fishing boats and many dozens of coast guard vessels, Beijing has challenged its neighbors' sovereignty over exclusive economic zones drawn according to UNCLOS rules. It has driven Vietnamese fishermen out of traditional fishing grounds, wrested the aquatic resources of Scarborough Shoal from Manila's control, harassed oil and gas exploration off Vietnam's central coast, and planted markers on James Shoal, 50 miles off the Malaysian coast and 2200 miles south of China's Hainan Island. This year China again proved its mastery of the tactical initiative, deploying a deep-sea oil drilling rig and an armada of escort vessels into waters near Vietnam's central coast while sending a flotilla of seagoing pumps, dredges and cement mixers further south with the mission of converting a handful of reefs into artificial islets. China, it seems, has no intention of submitting its sweeping territorial claims to rulings by international tribunals. It evidences little more interest in negotiating a Code of Conduct with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. At most, Chinese spokesmen have hinted at a disposition to be generous when and only when Vietnam or the Philippines acknowledge the superior merit of China's claims. Added now is profound worry that Beijing's steadily more aggressive tactics there and its dismissal, whenever inconvenient, of the rules of the international order reveal China’s true nature with which the international community must contend in other places in times to come. In the South China Sea, as elsewhere in the world, US engagement is essential if China's ambitions are to be effectively countered. Tough talk alone will not stiffen the ASEAN backbone nor impress Beijing. From a tactical perspective, the US has behaved as if there were no viable options in the large space between denunciation of Chinese provocations and deploying the 7th Fleet. China on the other hand has consistently exploited opportunities in the middle space. It has relied on paramilitary assets, coast guard ships and auxiliary "fishing boats", to further its sovereign ambitions while the Peoples Liberation Army Navy, PLAN, waits discreetly just over the horizon. Mimicking Chinese tactics, the US and Asian friends and allies could step up cooperation among their coast guards, prominently including a robust schedule of multilateral training exercises at sea. Military assistance that enhances Southeast Asian states' abilities to keep watch over their maritime frontiers will reduce China's capability to spring unpleasant surprises. Hanoi and Washington have been courting since summer of 2012 and that intensified this summer. Forging a strategic entente is not easy for either Hanoi or Washington. Each must give a bit on political rights. The US has already intervened effectively in support of the Philippines. Steps to upgrade and reinforce Philippine maritime surveillance and self-defense capabilities have had a tonic effect, allaying concerns that Manila may engage in risky, desperate behavior. There's no way for the United States to engage more actively in the South China Sea issues without angering China. That would probably have short-term negative consequences for US-China cooperation in other arenas, though Beijing is unlikely to refrain from cooperation that is in its own interest in order to punish Washington. The longer-term consequences of limiting China's overweening ambition will be salutary - Beijing will understand that it cannot rewrite the rules of international relations at will. Yale Global |
![]() Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie - C Sword 90 | |
![]() |
|
| Hong Nam | Sep 30 2014, 11:34 AM Post #5 |
|
Bought by China
![]()
|
At UN, PH rejects China's dangerous, reckless acts Ayee Macaraig Sep 30, 2014 UNITED NATIONS - The Philippines pointed out contradictions in China's words and actions, telling the United Nations that Beijing repeatedly violated international law in its "expansionist claim" despite an appeal to follow "fair and just rules." Without mentioning China by name, Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario gave a detailed enumeration of Beijing's actions in the South China Sea, saying these threatened peace and stability, and breached international law. The Philippines is claiming parts of the sea, which it calls the West Philippine Sea. "Instead of peacefully resolving the maritime disputes within the framework of international law, the said State embarked on a series of dangerous, reckless and forceful actions in an attempt to impose unilateral change in the maritime status quo of the South China Sea." "In the last two years, China has undertaken massive land reclamation works in Johnson Reef, McKennan, and Hughes Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Gaven Reef in the Spratlys." "Earlier this year, said State imposed a unilateral moratorium on fishing in some areas of the South China Sea, which infringes on the legitimate sovereign rights of the Philippines and other Coastal States to their Exclusive Economic Zones." "After forcibly occupying the tiny rocks of Scarborough Shoal within 126 M (nautical miles) of the Philippine island of Luzon, the aforementioned State refused to abide by a mutual agreement to deescalate tensions by not withdrawing its vessels from the said rocks." - Albert del Rosario, Philippine Foreign Secretary Devoting a length of his speech to the topic, Del Rosario said China's actions formed part of a pattern to "force change" as it refuses to join the Philippines in a historic arbitration case to settle the dispute before a UN-backed tribunal at The Hague. China is questioning the court's jurisdiction. The Philippines' top diplomat defended his country's move, saying Manila "resorted to the rule of law" in response to a rising military, economic and political power. The former Philippine envoy to the US hailed international law as "the core instrument for resolving maritime disputes," which China violated through its actions despite its rhetoric. Just last Saturday, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on world leaders in the same assembly to "use fair and just rules" in solving disputes. Del Rosario said that in reality, China does the opposite. China has undertaken massive land reclamation works in Johnson Reef, McKennan, and Hughes Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Gaven Reef in the Spratlys. Analysts said China's dredging and reclamation are meant to impose its interpretation of reefs and shoals' sovereignty ahead of the decision in the arbitration case. At the UN, Del Rosario called for global support for the Philippines' so-called "Triple Action Plan" proposal, which China rejected when it was first presented to ASEAN. Arbitration is the final approach under the plan. The immediate approach is a freeze of developments that escalate tensions in the region while the intermediate approach is concluding talks for the creation of a binding ASEAN-China Code of Conduct on the South China Sea. "The Philippines is pursuing such a resolution through Arbitration and believes that the Arbitration decision will clarify maritime entitlements and will pave the way for the full resolution of the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. These approaches under the Triple Action Plan can be pursued simultaneously. It does not prejudice territorial claims." China's Wang has said that if the Philippines wants to pursue the plan, it should first withdraw the arbitration case and "return to the first step." Rappler Edited by Hong Nam, Sep 30 2014, 11:38 AM.
|
![]() Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie - C Sword 90 | |
![]() |
|
| Hong Nam | Oct 17 2014, 09:58 PM Post #6 |
|
Bought by China
![]()
|
The Chinese Navy will soon have a stronger presence throughout the entire West Philippines Sea. Is this the prelude to a Chinese ADIZ in the region? It's really not that difficult to imagine its possibility. Perhaps by changing the facts on the "ground" they might hope to redefine what an island is. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), states that islands generate a 12 nm territorial sea and a 200 nm EEZ, partially submerged reef and rocks only generate a 12 nm territorial sea, while fully submerged reefs and rocks get nothing. By transforming submerged reefs into islands, China is seeking to gain EEZ claims on something that gets nothing. And when they eventually do. Who will be there to stop them? |
![]() Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie - C Sword 90 | |
![]() |
|
| Hong Nam | Oct 25 2014, 06:56 PM Post #7 |
|
Bought by China
![]()
|
Gregory Poling: China's legal guessing game in the Spratlys - reef, rock or island? October 16, 2014 In June, the Philippine government released photographic evidence documenting China's efforts to expand five tiny spits of land it occupies in the disputed Spratly Islands: Johnson, Cuarteron, Hughes, Gaven and Eldad reefs. Subsequent reports have suggested a sixth, Fiery Cross Reef, may have also been expanded. The reefs in question remain extremely small, isolated and nearly impossible to defend. Their potential military uses remain few and, in any case, are a more distant concern than their legal ramifications. Aside from China's rationale for this provocative buildup, its choice of reefs for expansion indicates that at least for some in Beijing, it is about stymying Manila's ongoing case over China's maritime claims at the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Defining an island According to UNCLOS, there are two requirements for a feature to qualify as an "island": 1. The feature in question must be above water at high tide. 2. It must be capable of supporting human habitation or independent economic life. Those features that fulfill the first but not the second are legally "rocks" entitled to only a 12-nautical-mile - about 22km - territorial sea around them. Those that fail on both counts are at best low-tide elevations that are underwater at high tide and therefore not eligible for an independent claim of sovereignty. They are considered part of the seabed and thus belong to whichever state is entitled to the continental shelf on which they sit, according to legal precedent. The Philippines is arguing in court that four of the features China currently occupies - Mischief, Hughes, Gaven and Subi reefs - are below water at high tide and therefore cannot be claimed as land by China. Four more features, according to Manila, are merely rocks, not islands. These include Scarborough Shoal, and Johnson, Cuarteron and Fiery Cross reefs. China, by signing UNCLOS, agreed it would be legally bound to obey. Therefore, its best option is to have the case, at least in large part, dismissed. China's trump card? China knows it can do little to avoid the court ordering a clarification of the nine-dash line, and such a ruling would not necessarily force Beijing to limit its claims in the South China Sea, as long as it could find another way to justify them. Most international legal experts would agree that a state cannot transform a submerged feature or low-tide elevation into an island by dumping sand on top of it until it finally rises above the waves. Most would also agree that a rock is unlikely to be made legally habitable, and therefore become an island, by expansion, although that point is less certain. There are no precedents for the scope of China's land-reclamation tactics. But in either case, China does not need to convince a court that it has created legal islands. It just needs to make it impossible to determine the original geography of the features in question. And this is where artificial island building could prove useful for Beijing and disastrous for other claimants. Surveys of the Spratly Islands by claimants and others have been very few and very poor. Indeed, there seems to be no comprehensive survey currently available that would meet the requirements of a court. That raises the possibility that the judges hearing the Philippines' case, and those in any future cases brought by other claimants, could rule that they lack the ability to determine the original status of features as islands, rocks or nothing at all. In that case, the Southeast Asian claimants could lose their only real advantage against Beijing - recourse to the law. That would mean Beijing's reclamation work will have paid off handsomely by negating any role the courts could have in managing and limiting the scope of the South China Sea disputes, keeping them firmly in the "might makes right" arena that China clearly prefers. Nikkei Asian Review Edited by Hong Nam, Oct 25 2014, 07:10 PM.
|
![]() Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie - C Sword 90 | |
![]() |
|
| Hong Nam | Oct 29 2014, 02:11 PM Post #8 |
|
Bought by China
![]()
|
What Does China Mean When It Celebrates the "International Rule of Law"? by Julian Ku In observance of United Nations Day on October 24, China's foreign minister Wang Yi issued a long statement expressing China's view of itself as a "staunch defender and builder of international law". The statement is pretty predictable in its broad pledge for Chinese support to "international law" or the "international rule of law." However, there are a few points relating to China's emphasis on sovereignty that are worth noting: * Philippines and UNCLOS arbitral tribunal: Don't You Dare Ruin International Law "National and international judicial institutions should avoid overstepping their authority in interpreting and applying international law. Still less should they encroach on the rights and interests of other countries under the pretext of 'the rule of law' in total disregard of objectivity and fairness." - This is clearly a warning signal to the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal formed to resolve the Philippines claim against China. This is another sign there will be no backing down on this arbitration. China is going to continue to loudly proclaim its commitment to rule of law, and continue to reject and maybe even denigrate the legitimacy of this arbitration. * International Rule OF Law, not Rule BY Law In promoting international rule of law, the most important thing is to use universally applicable rules in international relations to distinguish right and wrong, end disputes and seek a win-win solution through coordination. This is vital to international rule of law. The formulation, interpretation and application of international law should all be conducive to this goal. Under no circumstances should we inflate the arrogance of hegemonism and power politics, still less use international rule of law to instigate disagreement and friction,for it will only lead us to a wrong direction. - There is a traditional Chinese "Legalist" tradition that thinks of law as an instrument for ruling society, but less so as a constraint on lawmakers and government. Most expect the Party to remain effectively above the law for most key matters in the future, but for law to be used as a mechanism of social and political control of everyone else. - Indeed, in its call for universally applicable principles, democratic lawmaking, and the use of law to restrain strong states from taking advantage of the weak, the Chinese Communist Party is invoking a version of rule of law that many Westerners would be familiar with. It will be interesting to see if this conception bleeds over into the Party's push for domestic rule of/by law reform. Opinio Juris Edited by Hong Nam, Oct 29 2014, 05:52 PM.
|
![]() Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie - C Sword 90 | |
![]() |
|
| 1 user reading this topic (1 Guest and 0 Anonymous) | |
| « Previous Topic · West Philippine Sea · Next Topic » |









8:43 AM Jul 11