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| HK Bus Hostage Tragedy 2010 (aftermath. etc.); updates, discussions | |
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| Tweet Topic Started: Aug 23 2010, 12:08 PM (6,538 Views) | |
| spraret | Aug 26 2010, 01:55 PM Post #121 |
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Update from the Senate: Magtibay: It was Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim who ordered the arrest of the brother of Capt. Mendoza. |
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| spraret | Aug 26 2010, 02:12 PM Post #122 |
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NCRPO Santiago says if he were ground commander, would have designated cops in pairs to cover every bus window |
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| fatbat_mca | Aug 26 2010, 02:15 PM Post #123 |
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ang galing naman , parang wala ring palpak ang British armed forces, even the vaunted SAS has its share of blunders - remember Bravo Two Zero? |
oh my sofie!
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| israeli | Aug 26 2010, 04:34 PM Post #124 |
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http://raissarobles.com/2010/08/26/hong-ko...-aquinos-aides/ Hong Kong leader Tsang’s phone calls stopped with President Aquino’s aides Raissa Robles and Fanny W. Y. Fung Updated on Aug 26, 2010 A South China Morning Post exclusive [NOTE: I am posting this with the permission of my editor. Just to clarify, I did talk to foreign affairs spokesman Ed Malaya to get the department perspective but he declined to comment.] It was the case of the telephone calls that didn’t get through. An anxious Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen was never put through to Philippine President Benigno Aquino on Monday. Despite at least two phone calls, Aquino’s aides did not tell their head of state that Hong Kong’s leader needed to speak to him. This is how it all started: It is 4pm – the hostage crisis has lasted for more than five hours. Tsang, watching the drama unfold on television, is desperate to contact the new Philippines leader. Some time after 4pm, Tsang’s staff dial the main line to Malacanang Palace. They try again about four hours later. Both times they speak to an Aquino aide, but the president does not get the messages. Later that night, with eight Hongkongers dead, Tsang is close to tears at a press conference. He demands an explanation. “I hope the Philippine government can give me a full account of what happened.” An account of that breakdown in communication between Hong Kong and Manila emerged yesterday, with Malacanang admitting it had passed on the responsibility of handling the phone calls to the Department of Foreign Affairs, according to protocol. Hong Kong, after all, does not handle foreign affairs, Beijing does. The department’s envoys did not follow up that night. Tsang eventually got to speak to Aquino the following day, after the latter had met the Chinese ambassador. Ricky Carandang, who heads the Presidential Communications Group, said Aquino was not aware of the first call because he was in a meeting and because the call came in through the palace’s main phone line with no prior notice. Carandang said the caller was an aide of Tsang, and an aide of Aquino answered the phone. He said Aquino’s aide knew who Tsang was, but was unsure it was really from his office. The palace contacted the Foreign Affairs Department to set up a phone call through Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo, in what would be diplomatic protocol. Presidential spokesman Ed Lacierda said he phoned Romulo’s spokesman Ed Malaya to convey the request to arrange a conversation between Tsang and Aquino. No word came back, so Lacierda tried to phone Malaya again three times but could not reach him. The department declined to tell the Post why no one returned Tsang’s calls that night. After his telephone conversation with the president on Tuesday, Tsang said in a video posted on the internet: “The first thing he told me was that he was sorry for not having called me back [on Monday] because he was then busy commanding the operation.” But citing unnamed sources, Filipino journalist Ellen Tordesillas had a different take on the debacle. She said Aquino had “told his staff [that day] that he won’t be taking any calls unless it’s extremely important. When Tsang called, the one who took the call didn’t know who Donald Tsang was. Following the instruction, the staff member did not pass on the call to Aquino.” |
| "To secure peace is to prepare for war." - Carl Von Clausewitz | |
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| edwin | Aug 26 2010, 05:54 PM Post #125 |
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So, our SWAT teams are only words, not by action .. How can The PNP-SWAT become a SWAT if a simple door entry to that bus is a Struggle to them..??? Sorry Wala Ako Training, that is the standard of our PNP-SWAt. OUr SWAT teams are really Highly Qualified.........by Un-Qualified people..
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![]() It is difficult to say what is impossible, for the dream of yesterday is the hope of today and reality of tomorrow. | |
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| Fmr TOPP Awardee 82'PNP | Aug 26 2010, 06:03 PM Post #126 |
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The purpose of Tsang's failed call to Pres. Aquino is to vent his frustration about what he saw on TV - the botched operation. One can also raise the question on whether Pres. Aquino was himself also watching the drama, and if he was'nt, why? It is also an interesting issue to discuss on why the President of the Philippines was'nt able to monitor the live coverage of the incident while the rest of the world was watching and witnessed every embarrassing scenario of the botched operation. |
![]() "GUILTY CONSCIENCE NEEDS NO ACCUSER" | |
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| mazingu | Aug 26 2010, 08:19 PM Post #127 |
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Now it's confirmed SAF & LRB operators were made available but were never used by MPD Chief Magtibay http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/08/26/10...used-rescue-try Elite security troops not used in rescue try By Jojo Malig, abs-cbnNEWS.com Posted at 08/26/2010 7:53 PM | Updated as of 08/26/2010 7:54 PM MANILA, Philippines - Why was an elite police unit better than the Manila Police District's (MPD) Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) group not used to free hostages being held by dismissed senior inspector Rolando Mendoza? Director Leocadio Santiago Jr., National Capital Region Police Office chief, struggled to answer the question raised by Sen. Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr. at the Senate inquiry Thursday into the tragic hostage-taking crisis in Manila. Marcos had in mind the elite unit of the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Special Action Force (SAF), which Santiago himself previously led. Members of the SAF, which is patterned after the British Special Air Service (SAS), are trained by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and Critical Incident Response Group, as well as the French RAID and Israeli YAMAM police special forces units. Some SAF officers are assigned to SWAT teams but most remain with their core unit. They specialize in commando-type unconventional and urban warfare operations, according to the PNP. SAF units are also better armed and equipped to handle crises. Their close-combat arsenal includes Heckler & Koch MP5 and FN P90 submachine guns. Other SAF weapons include various types of assault guns, semi-automatic shotguns, and sniper rifles. Santiago told Marcos that during the hostage-taking incident, SAF troops were placed under the control of MPD head Chief Superintendent Rodolfo Magtibay, who was the ground commander of police forces at the time. They were never deployed. “So it’s up to the ground commander? (I) have to question your judgment,” Marcos told Santiago. “You have the best unit waiting and not doing anything.” Senate President Pro Tempore Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada echoed Marcos' statement while grilling Magtibay. "Walang ginawa ang SAF kahit nandoon sila? Hind ninyo ni-utilize ang kanilang kakayahan?" Estrada asked. "Yes," Magtibay said. The SAF’s known operations in the past include the March 15, 2005 hostage crisis at the Metro Manila Rehabilitation Center of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City that was captured by Abu Sayyaf inmates. The elite police squad, backed up by SWAT units, killed Alhamser Limbong alias Commander Kosovo; Ghalib Andang alias Commander Robot; Nadzmi Sabdullah alias Commander Global; and Sadit Abdul Ganit Husim alias Commander Lando. A successful end to the 30-hour crisis resulted in various foreign groups abroad praising the SAF. Police Officer 1 Abel Arreola was the only SAF operative killed during the assault. Research also shows that the SAF was also deployed against rebel government soldiers from 1986 to 1989; during the Oakwood mutiny in July 27, 2003; and to help secure US President George W Bush during his visit to the Philippines in 2003. AFP special unit The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), meanwhile, revealed that a company of highly trained and well-equipped soldiers were also sent to the Quirino grandstand to deal with the hostage crisis. Magtibay also decided against calling into action the US-trained Light Reaction Company (LRC) which is under the military's Joint Special Operations Group. “At the start of the hostage situation, we immediately contacted our (police) counterparts and we offered services coming from our special and elite unit,” AFP spokesman Brig. Gen. Jose Mabanta said. He said the offer and coordination was made “at the highest level.” “However, we were told that we just have to be on standby. So apparently, as we all know, it was never used,” Mabanta added. “The Light Reaction Company (is) a very viable alternative. Its specialty is (addressing) hostage-taking and release of hostages,” he said. US Special Forces troops began training several LRCs in the late 1990s to fight extremist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf. Mabanta said the military did not insist on deploying the LRC to help rescue Mendoza’s hostages. “We just presented that there is a viable alternative and it was really up to the forces on the ground whether to utilize it or not,” he added, stressing that the AFP cannot interfere in decisions made by PNP officials. ------------------------------ Sobrang bilib talaga ni Magtibay sa SWAT nya
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| spearhead | Aug 26 2010, 08:48 PM Post #128 |
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DoctorNO, Your Neutral Observer.
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Same SWAT teams rehearsed behind the Grand Stand around noon before making the assault: http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/video/nation/me...sed-assault-bus |
"Men of War must learn the art of numbers or he will not know how to array his troops." - Plato![]() ![]() | |
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| raider1011 | Aug 26 2010, 11:27 PM Post #129 |
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It's like basketball, what's bad for the country's image is the whole world believes we sent out our starting five. In reality ... |
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God grant me the courage not to give up what I think is right even though I think it is hopeless. || Chester W. Nimitz Loyalty to the Nation ALL the time, loyalty to the Government when it deserves it. || Mark Twain | |
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| israeli | Aug 27 2010, 01:23 AM Post #130 |
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What the police should have done in Manila bus crisis http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jCeZ0RYNnM8...player_embedded ----- AFP elite team offered for hostage crisis but never used -- spokesman By Cynthia Balana Philippine Daily Inquirer First Posted 18:32:00 08/26/2010 MANILA, Philippines -- The Armed Forces of the Philippines offered a special and elite military strike force as a “viable alternative” to deal with Monday's hostage drama in Manila but was never used by the police ground commander in resolving the crisis. Brig. Gen. Jose Mabanta, the AFP spokesman, told reporters in Camp Aguinaldo, on Thursday, said the Light Reaction Company (LRC), a composite unit of highly trained and better equipped soldiers from the Navy SEALs, Army and the Air Force, was deployed by the AFP to the scene when the actions started but they were merely placed on the sideline. “At the start of the hostage situation, we immediately contacted our Philippine National Police counterparts and we offered services coming from our special and elite unit and this was gladly recognized,” Mabanta said. “However, we were told that we just have to be on standby alert so apparently as we all know, it was never used,” he said. The LRC, which is under the Joint Operations Group (JSOG) of the AFP, became famous for many successful encounters with the Abu Sayyaf and is also being used by the Marines in Basilan during counter operations. One LRC company has at least 50 to 60 men. According to Mabanta, the JSOG per se has the ability to fight under abnormal conditions, including limited visibility, while the LRC's specialization includes hostage-taking and release of hostages. Also, the JSOG is able to operate under its realm of responsibility -- the Army on ground assault, the Air force in high-jacking of airlines, and the Navy under maritime conditions. Mabanta said he did not know why the LRC was not used at all to complement the police force but acknowledged that it was the call of the ground commander not to do so. He noted that the coordination between the AFP and the PNP at that time was “at the highest level.” Asked if the outcome of the hostage-taking crisis could have been different had the LRC been used, Mabanta quipped : “I can never say because that may be presumptuous. I really don't know the equipment and the training of the SWAT team that was involved.” Mabanta said that regular training would be important in dealing with all sorts of situations, including hostage-taking. “Remember that even the SWAT that was deployed could have been able to accomplish its mission if the situation permitted, meaning to say ang daming nangyari (so many things happened) so they could have also performed the mission if all the things, which they anticipated had fallen their way,” he stressed. He stopped short of blaming the SWAT for the tragic ending of the incident. He reminded the people that the incident could happen anywhere in the world. “This is certainly a fiasco but it is not only confined to the Philippines. It happens in the best of them, meaning to say it happens in First World countries, even the United States, even in Europe. It happened in our country being a Third World. It is just but a normal thing,” Mabanta said. He said that the coordination between the AFP and the PNP would have to be further cemented and institutionalized in order to effectively deal with any crisis situation. |
| "To secure peace is to prepare for war." - Carl Von Clausewitz | |
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8:49 AM Jul 11